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Chapter 3

The Moral Necessity of Anger
Krista K. Thomason

Philosophers have long been divided on the moral status of anger. On one
side are the skeptics who think that anger is damaging, dangerous, or irratio
nal. Seneca, for example, describes anger as “raging with an inhuman desire
to inflict pain” (2010, 14). More recently, Nussbaum has argued that anger
is either irrational or narcissistic (2016, 24-29). It is, as she puts it “always
normatively problematic” (2016, 5). On the other side, there are the optimists
who think that anger can be morally valuable and even morally necessary.
Aristotle argues that the right kind of anger is a virtue and that “people who
do not get angry in the circumstances one should are thought to be foolish”
(2002, 152/1126a5). Solomon argues that anger is both “rational and reason
able” when it is a response to a serious offense (2007, 25). As Bailey puts it,
“Anger is the emotion of injustice” (2018, 93).
My aim in this chapter is to defend a strong version of the optimist’s
claim. Anger is not just rational and reasonable, but also a morally necessary
response to wrongdoing. The version of the argument that I will defend is
sometimes called the constitutive view.' That is, feelings of anger are consti
tutive of the proper moral response to the offense, ill-treatment, or injustice.^
The constitutive view has been the target of at least two objections. First,
there appear to be examples of people who adequately respond to wrongdo
ing and yet seem not to feel anger. Second, given anger’s clear potential for
damage, it would be better for moral agents to respond to wrongdoing without
anger. In order to defend the moral necessity of anger, I argue against both of
these objections. First, I will explain the constitutive view and the objections
against it in more detail.
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THE CONSTITUTIVE VIEW
Several philosophers have defended a version of the constitutive view
of moral emotions. The constitutive view is inspired by P. F. Strawson’s
arguments about resentment and its connection to our practices of holding
people responsible (1963/2003). Roughly, on this view, emotions are at least
partially constitutive of some feature of moral psychology (e.g., judgments,
responses, values, practices, or commitments). Constitutivists are not univo
cal in their explanations. For example, Wallace argues that feelings of resent
ment are constitutive of holding others to moral expectations (1994, 20-24).
Murphy argues that resentment is constitutive of one’s sense of moral selfrespect (2003, 19-20). In spite of these differences, constitutive views share
the same basic strategy. The aim is to explain the role that emotions have in
our moral psychology by showing how emotions (at least partially) constitute
some psychological features of moral agency.
In spite of their differences, constitutive views are vulnerable to the same
type of objection. The objection goes this way: the constitutive view is false
because it cannot show that emotions are necessarily constitutive of moral
judgments or responses. That is, we can think of cases in which moral agents
have the moral judgment or response in question without also feeling the
corresponding emotion. If these cases are legitimate, then the emotion is not
really constitutive after all.
This objection is particularly salient when we consider negative emotions
that seem to have significant potential for damage or harm. Take shame as
an example. Many philosophers have argued that shame is a valuable moral
emotion because it shows that we care about living up to ideals that we value
(Rawls 1971/2003; Taylor 1985; Mason 2010; Deonna et al. 2012). On views
like these, shame is constitutive of the painful realization that we have fallen
short of the ideals to which we aspire. Skeptics point out how damaging
shame can be: feelings of shame often drive people to self-destructive behav
ior, including self-harm and suicide (Isenberg 1949; Kekes 1988; Manion
2002; Nussbaum 2004). Surely, the skeptics will claim, we do not necessarily
need feelings of shame in order to care about living up to our ideals. In fact,
getting over shame seems to be psychologically healthier. If it is both possible
and desirable to train ourselves out of damaging emotions, we ought to do so.
This same skeptical argument is used against anger. Constitutivists have
argued that anger partially constitutes the recognition of an expression of
ill will or wrongdoing (Strawson 1963/2003; Murphy and Hampton 1988;
Wallace 1994; Murphy 2003; Darwall 2006). If someone does me a wrong or
expresses ill will toward me and I do not react with anger, constitutivists will
argue that, absent some other explanation, I have failed to perceive this treat
ment as wrong or undeserved. Similar to shame, skeptics will argue that it is
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possible for an agent to recognize ill-treatment without feeling anger (Watson
1993; Pettigrove 2012; Nussbaum 2016). Moreover, given anger’s potential
for damage or harm, it would be desirable for everyone to feel less anger or
to get over such feelings as much as possible.
There are two claims that comprise the skeptical position: what I will call
the necessity claim and the desirability claim. The first denies that feelings of
anger are necessary in order to properly respond to wrongdoing. The second
asserts that, given anger’s downsides, it is morally desirable that we try to
feel less of it or get over it as much as is possible. 1 will argue against both
of these claims.

THE NECESSITY CLAIM
Skeptics usually deploy two strategies to argue that anger is not morally nec
essary in order to respond to wrongdoing. One is to argue that it is conceptu
ally possible to separate feelings of anger from judgments of wrongdoing.^
The other is to appeal to moral exemplars who seem to have gotten over their
anger.
To illustrate the first strategy, Pettigrove and Tanaka introduce the distinc
tion between anger being warranted and anger being necessary (2014, 273).
To claim that anger is warranted as a response to ill-treatment is merely to
claim that it would be intelligible or perhaps even permissible for the victim
to feel anger when she is mistreated. Arguing that anger is warranted is a
weaker claim than that it is necessary. Pettigrove and Tanaka argue that this
weaker claim is more plausible because we can see both from philosophical
literature and from everyday experience examples of people who are able to
make moral judgments and yet do not feel anger (2014, 276-277). If these
examples are plausible, then it appears as though the stronger version of the
constitutive view is false.
The strategy of divorcing feelings of anger from responses to wrongdoing
raises an important question for the constitutive view. What precisely does it
mean to say that anger is a necessary part of our responses to wrongdoing?
Philosophers who ascribe to the constitutive view provide different answers
to this question. Here I will rely on a version of the account that I have
defended elsewhere (Thomason 2018). On this version of the constitutive
view, a liability to anger is constitutive of our capacity to recognize, judge,
or appreciate intentional wrongdoing or ill-treatment."* There are several parts
of this account to clarify. First, I and other philosophers who defend this
view will speak in terms of liability to anger.’ Advocates of the constitutive
view accept that our emotions are not under our direct control and that they
sometimes surprise us. They can arise in situations when we do not expect
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them, and they can fail to show up when we assume they will. We may, for
example, suffer a serious betrayal at the hands of a loved one and, to our own
shock or confusion, not feel anger (Thomason 2018, 147-148). It therefore
makes more sense to talk about a liability to anger being a necessary part of
recognizing wrongdoing. Having a liability to an emotion means that we are
disposed to feel it in some set of specified circumstances because of values or
commitments that we hold. The fact that we might not feel anger at a particu
lar moment does not pose an objection to this version of the constitutive view.
Additionally, it is important to understand what is meant by a recognition
or response to wrongdoing on this view. Crucially, recognizing a wrong is
not a simply matter of assenting to a proposition. This way of thinking is to
misunderstand the complex nature of judging or responding to wrongdoing.
As Solomon argues, “Anger is not just a judgment of offense, but a network
of interlocking judgments concerning one’s status and relationship with the
offending party, the gravity and mitigating circumstances of the offense, and
the urgency of revenge” (1988, 186). On the constitutive view, the network
that Solomon describes comprises the liability to an emotion. Holding some
set of values, beliefs, desires, and commitments is to be susceptible to emo
tions that are relevant to them. A liability to an emotion is not merely the
belief that such an emotion would be warranted. The constitutivist will deny
that we can easily separate our beliefs about wrongdoing from our emotional
responses to it. To use Rawls’s example, to love another person is to be liable
to joy in her presence and sorrow in her absence, and my love for her is pres
ent in these emotions (Rawls 1971/2003, 426). If I am liable to neither this
joy nor sorrow, the constitutive view will claim that I do not actually love
her. In the case of anger, if I am not liable to anger when someone wrongs
me, then I fail to recognize or appreciate the wrong. There is no such thing as
a bare, dispassionate, merely propositional judgment that someone wronged
me (Solomon 1988, 187). This is not to claim that judgment must be explo
sive or expressive, or that our anger must be obvious and overt (Solomon
1988, 188). The constitutive view will, however, insist that judging some
thing as wrongdoing or ill-treatment must involve a liability to feelings of
anger. Again, not feeling a particular emotion at a particular moment does
not affect the liability to that emotion. The focus of the constitutive view is
not on emotions as episodes. Instead, its focus is the role that emotions play
in our network of judgments, commitments, and values.
The version of the constitutive view that I and others defend also classi
fies anger as a reactive attitude. Reactive attitudes arise within the context of
what Strawson called the participant stance (1963/2003, 79). The participant
stance is so named because it presupposes our participation in relations with
others (1963/2003, 76-79). Within the participant stance, we see others as
responsible moral agents to whom we owe some basic form of goodwill and
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from whom we can expect basic goodwill (1963/2003, 76). It is because of
this mindset or commitment that we are liable to feelings of anger when
another person shows us disregard. Strawson contrasts the participant stance
with the objective stance (1963/2003, 79). Taking an objective stance toward
another person is to see that person “as an object of social policy” or someone
to be “managed or cured or handled or trained” (ibid.). The objective stance
does not presume that another person is a responsible agent capable of acting
autonomously and intentionally or capable of showing us proper regard and
disregard. We would not be liable to anger toward, suppose, a rude automaton
who was built to hurl insults at passersby.® When constitutivists claim that
anger is a necessary part of recognizing and responding to wrongdoing, we
assume that the wrongdoing is intentional and that it originates from a respon
sible fellow moral agent. We are liable to anger because we see our fellow
agents as responsible persons rather than mere causes of events, automatons,
or objects of social policy. To summarize, the constitutivist will argue that a
liability to anger is a necessary part of recognizing a wrong done by a fellow
moral agent.
Skeptics will argue that we have examples of people who can recognize
wrongdoing without anger. The first question to raise is whether they react
to wrongdoing without feeling anger or without being liable to anger. The
constitutivists can accept that people do not always respond to wrongdoing
by experiencing the emotion of anger. Again, our emotions are not perfectly
under the control of our will, so we do not feel them on command. What
constitutivists will deny is that a person can properly recognize wrongdoing
without being liable to anger—that such a person literally never feels anger
or has never felt anger in other cases. The skeptical case made here needs to
be filled out in more detail. One possible interpretation is that we can imagine
someone who can assent to the proposition “This action is wrong” without
feeling anger. This version of the objection mistakes the complex act of judg
ing or recognizing for simply assenting to a proposition (Solomon 1988, 186).
What it means to judge, recognize, or appreciate wrongdoing is complex and
cannot be reduced to one proposition or belief. Another possible interpreta
tion is that we are able to imagine the conceptual possibility of someone who
does not feel anger and can still judge wrongdoing. It is difficult to know what
precisely this conceptual imagining amounts to. Suppose we try to construct a
similar case: imagine a parent who takes care of his children, plays with them,
participates in their lives, wishes them well, is pained by their suffering, and
overjoyed by their happiness and yet also, let us suppose, does not actually
feel love for them. A case like this seems to distinguish acts of love and care,
loving relations, and parental commitments from something like a raw emo
tional feel. The constitutivist will argue that this move is possible only in the
most abstract sense. The mere conceptual possibility of such a person poses
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no risk to the constitutive view because the necessity claim is not merely a
conceptual claim. It is a claim about moral relations as they exist in the world
for creatures like us.
The reply from the skeptic helps us segue into the second strategy. Skeptics
often appeal to cases of moral exemplars who appear to have gotten over or
transformed their feelings of anger. These exemplars, they will argue, show
that judging wrongdoing without anger is not a mere conceptual possibility.
Indeed, these cases show that creatures like us can recognize wrongdoing
without the liability to anger. The two most common exemplars are Martin
Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi (Watson 1993, 147-148; Nussbaum
2016, 218-225). Nussbaum’s discussion of King and Gandhi is thorough
and helps illustrate how they function as exemplars for getting over anger.
Nussbaum argues that both King and Gandhi see anger as inherently tied to an
immature and destructive wish for retaliation (2016, 221). King and Gandhi
argue that feelings of anger ought to be “channeled” or “purified” through
self-discipline and the reorientation of one’s attitude toward the objects of
one’s anger (2016, 221-222). This process will create a new outlook in which
one “carefully separates the deed from the doer, criticizing and repudiat
ing the bad deed, but not imputing unalterable evil to people” (2016, 222).
According to Nussbaum, King and Gandhi replace their anger with healthier
emotions such as grief and love (2016, 225). This replacement allows them to
respond appropriately to wrongdoing without the dangers and errors of anger.
Additionally, Pettigrove and Tanaka appeal to Santideva’s writings on anger
to show that the Bodhisattva likewise makes moral judgments and yet feels
no anger (2014, 272-273). On their reading, Santideva recommends weeding
anger out of our lives as much as possible in part because anger presupposes
a mistaken view about the importance of our own perspectives (2014, 273).
Nevertheless, the Bodhisattva (or the person who aspires to be one) can still
make moral judgments. Despite never feeling anger, “they adopt the right
sort of stance to the wrongdoing they identify, seeking to avoid such moral
failings in themselves and their actions and opposing them in others” (2014,
276).
I think we should we wary of the appeal to moral exemplars. First, the
fact that King and Gandhi are two of the most cited examples of people who
have gotten over anger might demonstrate that they are more anomalous than
they appear. If skeptics think that getting over anger is readily psychologi
cally available to us, it seems we should have more than two examples of
people who have achieved it. King also studied the nonviolent philosophy
of Gandhi, which suggests the commitments they share may be unique to
them (Thomason 2018, 167). Pettigrove and Tanaka resist this move by argu
ing that the criticisms about anger are far more widespread. They point out
that warnings against anger appear not just in Santideva, but also in many
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Other Buddhist texts, Eastern traditions, Stoicism, early Christian and Jewish
philosophers, and the sentimentalist tradition from the eighteenth century
(2014, 274-275). Of course, the fact that a view is widely shared does not
show that it is correct; the view that anger is central to our moral lives is also
widespread. Rather, Pettigrove and Tanaka’s point is that we cannot dismiss
views like Santideva’s (or King’s and Gandhi’s) as anomalous. Although this
conclusion is surely right, much more work needs to be done to determine the
details of these criticisms of anger. While I cannot examine all these accounts
of anger here, I will focus on King and Santideva and try to show that their
positions on anger are less straightforward than Nussbaum, Pettigrove, and
Tanaka present them.
Beginning with King, his views on anger are clearly complex. When he
describes the mindset of nonviolence, he says it is “nonaggressive physi
cally, but strongly aggressive spiritually” (1986, 7, 12, 18). Likewise, King
insists that while the nonviolent resister is physically passive, “his mind and
his emotions are always active, constantly seeking to persuade his opponent
he is wrong” (1986, 18). He encourages Black Americans to remain “malad
justed” to the injustices of segregation and discrimination (1986, 14). He also
repeatedly emphasizes that nonviolence should not be mistaken for or built on
cowardice (1986, 7, 12, 17). Given these remarks, King’s views on anger are
not unequivocally negative. It is difficult to know how to interpret his claim
that we ought to be emotionally active and spiritually aggressive without an
appeal to something like anger. More specifically, philosophers have argued
that King’s arguments presuppose a fitting or virtuous anger (Cogley 2014;
Bell 2009). It is abundantly clear that King rejects violence and hatred as
permissible responses to injustice (1986, 7-8, 12-13, 17-20). Yet rejecting
violence and hatred does not require rejecting anger. Other interpreters of
King might object to the characterization of spiritual and emotional activity
as anger, but my point here is merely to show that King’s views about anger
are not so straightforward. He might reject anger or he might only reject
excessive anger, hatred, and violence (Thomason 2018, 166).
Santideva’s views about anger are likewise complicated. First, it should be
noted that, contrary to popular conceptions of Buddhist philosophy, there is
no single view about anger in Buddhism. For example, McRae argues that
Tantric Buddhism advocates transforming, rather than eliminating, one’s
anger (2015, 472^73). With regard to Santideva, there is controversy in
the literature about the extent to which his text is meant to be a program
for cultivating virtue. For example, Garfield argues that Santideva’s text is,
like much of Buddhist ethics, an attempt to solve the existential problem of
suffering. On Garfield’s view, Santideva tries to solve that problem by “by
developing an understanding of our place in the complex web of interde
pendence (pratityasamutpdda) that is our world” (2011, 338). To interpret
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this project as a set of recommendations for moral self-improvement is to
shoehorn Santideva’s views into the framework of Western virtue ethics
(Garfield 2011, 335). Even if we set aside concerns like these, understand
ing Santideva’s position on anger is still not straightforward. Bommarito, for
instance, argues that there is a tension in Santideva’s criticism of anger and
his purpose in describing the way to the enlightened mind {bodhicitta). On
Bommarito’s view, Santideva argues against anger because anger assumes
that other people are anything more than the sum of conditions and causes
(2011, 364-365). According to this interpretation, Santideva seems to suggest
that being angry with people for the wrongs they do would be equivalent to
being angry with a storm that damages our house. As Bommarito points out,
however, the advice that Santideva provides is directed toward people who
are presumed to have at least some kind of agency—otherwise they would
be incapable of aspiring to bodhicitta (2011, 368-370). This tension may
lead us to ask whether Santideva really thinks that anger is as irrational or
misguided as interpreters claim. Of course, Santideva may still reject anger
for other reasons. My point is that the details of interpretation may show that
the rejections of anger from philosophers like King and Santideva are not
what they seem.
For the sake of the argument, let us suppose that King and Santideva do
reject anger. According to skeptics of the constitutive view, this conclu
sion would mean that they make moral judgments without feeling angry.
Presupposed in this argument is the view that they make the same moral judg
ments that those of us who are disposed to anger will make. I think we should
resist this assumption. Both King and Santideva have substantive moral and
metaphysical commitments that lead to their rejection of anger. These com
mitments reveal particular views about themselves, others, and the universe
that are in tension with the presuppositions of the constitutive view.
Let us start with King. King argues that the philosophy of nonviolence
involves seeing the forces of justice and evil at work in the world. He writes,
“There is something in the universe that unfolds for justice,” and the nonvio
lent resisters have felt “that as we struggled we had cosmic companionship”
(1986, 13-14). The job of the nonviolent resister is to prevent further evil
from entering the world—she must “cut off the chain of hate ... by projecting
an ethic of love into the world” (1986, 19). Seeing people as fighters for either
justice or evil is also supported by King’s commitment to the interconnect
edness of humanity. He writes, “All humanity is a single process ... If you
harm me, you harm yourself’ (1986, 20). As a result, the target of the spiri
tual aggression of nonviolence is not the individual who does wrong, but the
evil of the universe. He writes that “the attack is directed against the forces
of evil rather than against persons who happen to be doing the evil” (1986,
8, 18). King is clear throughout his writings that accepting the philosophy of
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nonviolence is a difficult task in part because he recognizes a powerful temp
tation to give in to hatred, bitterness, or violence (1986, 8, 10).
Santideva is committed to overcoming the centrality of the self as part
of the development of the enlightened mind (bodhicitta) (Bommarito 2011,
364-366; Garfield 2011, 343-344). That is, weeding anger out of one’s life
is possible when we come to the full realization and appreciation that the
self and its attachments and aversions are illusory. This requires weakening
the boundaries between self and others (Garfield 2011, 340-341), seeing the
actions of others as no different from the conditions or causes in the world
(Bommarito 2011, 360-362), and seeing oneself and others as ephemeral
and impermanent (Bommarito 2011, 365-366; Garfield 2011, 341-342, 347348). Santideva’s path to bodhicitta is meant to engender an “insight into the
nature of reality so deep that it transforms our way of seeing ourselves and
others” (Garfield 2011, 334).
The ethical outlooks of King and Santideva contain commitments (to
greater and lesser degrees) to what I will call depersonalization. They both
encourage us to see people as caught up in forces of the universe and to deemphasize the extent to which people are agents in the harm or suffering they
cause. Additionally, they ask us to see ourselves as fundamentally connected
to others, including those who wrong us. They also argue that we should see
ourselves as less agential than we think. For King, we are part of the forces
of justice and light, and we are bound to use the force of love in the face
of wrongdoing. For Santideva, we are interconnected, interdependent, and
ephemeral. Arguments like these pose no challenge to the constitutive view.
The constitutive view accepts the Strawsonian claim that anger is a reactive
attitude, which arises from within the participant stance (1963/2003, 79).
Being in this stance requires that we see other people as autonomous agents
who are not mere causal events or caught up in forces outside of them. It
is precisely this perception that King and Santideva ask us to deemphasize.
King and Santideva are committed to moral worldviews that do not presup
pose the kind of moral agency that Strawson does. Indeed, they advocate for a
moral point of view that transforms our traditional way of understanding our
selves and each other. King and Santideva recognize that it is natural for us to
be angry, given the commitments that we hold. What they ask is that we give
up or change those commitments and, in doing so, we will stop being angry.
The constitutive view can agree that if we alter or give up the participant
stance, then we may no longer feel anger toward wrongdoers. But this is just
to say that if we transform our views about ourselves, others, and the nature
of wrongdoing, then we will feel different emotions. Characterized this way,
skeptics can no longer claim that King and Santideva are making the same
moral judgments as the rest of us. They understand agency and wrongdoing
differently, which is why they do not respond to ill-treatment with anger.
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Moral exemplars like King and Santideva do not pose counterexamples to the
constitutive view. If anything, they show that if we alter our values, beliefs,
and commitments, our emotional lives will likewise be altered.
The skeptic can argue that we should do what figures like King and
Santideva ask. They might say that we would be morally better off rethinking
our relations to others and our conceptions of ourselves so that we were less
prone to anger. Notice that this is a new argument: the claim is no longer that
we can make the same moral judgments without feelings of anger. It is now
that we should alter our moral outlooks so that we can get rid of anger. This
is the desirability claim, to which I will now turn.

THE DESIRABILITY CLAIM
Recall that the desirability claim states that we would be better off getting
over our feelings of anger. There are two versions of this claim. The first ver
sion argues that because anger is damaging, harmful, or dangerous, we ought
to do our best to feel it as little as possible. Notice that this argument does not
outright reject the constitutive view. It simply emphasizes the downsides of
anger. The second version also argues that anger is dangerous or harmful, but
adds that we ought to follow the example of people like King and Santideva.
We should, in other words, rethink the values and commitments that make
us liable to anger because a world without anger would be a better world. I
respond to each of these versions of the desirability claim in turn.
We must examine more closely the claim that anger is harmful or damag
ing. One way to understand this claim is that some kinds of anger can be
harmful. The constitutive view can accept this claim. Of course, anger can
sometimes be excessive. For example, people can be rightly criticized for
being too angry about a relatively minor offense. Additionally, we might
think that it is bad to have a short temper, to stay angry for too long, or to be
angry too often. None of these criticisms are of anger per se, but rather how
people manage or relate to their anger. We might make the same criticisms
about other emotions, including positive ones—we might say that someone
is being too forgiving or too sympathetic. Also, some of these criticisms are
not about our emotions, but about a lack of perspective or proportionality
(Thomason 2015, 252-253). The person who is too angry at a small slight
could be criticized for being unfair or unreasonable. We might say that such
a person lacks perspective or fails to have good judgment about what sorts
of wrongs are worth getting upset about. We are able to make all of these
criticisms without claiming that there is something wrong with the person’s
anger qua anger. The constitutivist need not argue that every episode of anger
is good and valuable. She is committed to the claim that a liability to anger
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is valuable because it partially constitutes the recognition of wrongdoing.
Defending anger in this way does not entail that anger can never go wrong or
can never be criticized. The constitutivist holds that, in spite of its potential
dangers, anger is a valuable part of our emotional lives and that should not
wish to be rid of it.
I take it those who advocate for the desirability claim mean something
more than just that anger can sometimes be excessive. A stronger argument is
that there is something inherently wrong with anger. One version of this argu
ment is that anger is basically confused or irrational. For example, Pettigrove
and Tanaka (inspired by Santideva) argue that we become angry when our
desires are thwarted, but many of our desires are confused or not worth our
investment (2014, 277-279). In this way, anger is more often than not an
inappropriate or confused emotion. They further appeal to empirical evidence
that anger negatively influences our other judgments. Some psychological
studies purport to show that angry people are more likely to attribute nega
tive traits to people who are unlike them, to rely on stereotypes when\ihaking
judgments, and to see themselves as less biased (2014, 279-280). Studies
like these support Pettigrove and Tanaka’s claim that “anger is systematically
misleading” (2014, 281). Nussbaum also suggests that anger is inherently
irrational. On Nussbaum’s view, at the heart of anger is a wish for payback
for the harm done (2016, 15). The payback “is seen as somehow assuaging
the pain or making good the damage” caused by the original wrong (2016,
24). Yet according to Nussbaum, such a belief is irrational. To imagine that
by paying back the offender in kind, our own pain will thereby be alleviated
is “magical thinking” (ibid.). Alternatively, anger is a response to a perceived
diminution in status (2016, 25). An offender’s wrong is an act of down-rank
ing, and so payback is a way to restore balance by bringing the offender low
(2016, 26). Nussbaum argues that this way of understanding anger is likewise
irrational because it is fundamentally narcissistic (2016, 29). Wrongdoing is
not about comparatively high or low status, but rather about injustice (ibid.).
There are several points in these arguments that should be separated. The
first thing to note is that the conclusion about anger’s irrationality will depend
a great deal on the specifics of the accounts of anger. Pettigrove, Tanaka, and
Nussbaum argue that the payback wish is central to anger (2014, 277-278;
2016, 15). On these grounds, they then suggest that payback is irrational or
confused. One might dispute that the payback wish is part of the internal logic
of anger. We might, for example, think of anger as a challenge or a protest
against the offender’s behavior.’ On a view like this, anger accuses rather
than punishes. Even though the wish for payback might be a common experi
ence when people are angry, it may nevertheless not be an essential part of
anger. It could instead be a kind of common coping mechanism (Thomason
2017, 6). It may be quick and easy psychologically to move from recognizing
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that a person has wronged me to wanting to see that person hurt in return.
There could be any number of reasons why this move occurs: perhaps the
offender has made me feel powerless and hurting that person alleviates those
feelings. Maybe the payback wish is a desire to bring about a reciprocal
appreciation from the offender. If I hurt the offender as she has hurt me, she
will realize what it was like to be of the receiving end of ill will (Thomason
2017, 6). We need not settle on one explanation here. The point is merely to
show that it is an open question whether the wish for payback is essential to
feelings of anger. If it is not, then we cannot conclude that since the payback
wish is irrational, anger itself is irrational. We can pose the same questions
about Pettigrove and Tanaka’s claims that anger is about a thwarted desire
(2014, 277-279) or Nussbaum’s claims that anger is about down-ranking
(2016, 26-27). If anger turns out to be neither of these things, then whatever
conclusions we draw about anger from these accounts will not figure into
anger’s rationality.
My main aim in this chapter is to defend the constitutive view’s claim that
anger is a morally necessary response, so building and defending my own
account of anger would require more work than I can accomplish here. Also, I
wish to be pluralist to a certain extent because constitutive views are not uni
vocal in their characterizations of anger. Nonetheless, we should have some
sense of what anger is in order to respond to arguments about its irrationality.
Let me briefly sketch an account that draws on the work of other versions of
the constitutive view.®
The constitutivist will claim that anger is part of the recognition that
another person has treated me with disrespect or ill will. Feeling anger is
not a matter of merely believing that this is the case or making a judgment
that an event of a certain kind has occurred (Solomon 1988, 185-186).
Anger is an emotional protest or resistance to an offense or expression of
ill will. It arises in response to ill will because of the way one understands
oneself, the offender, and the relationship between the two. The reason I
am liable to anger when someone treats me with ill will is because I see
myself as a moral agent and I see that person as a moral agent (Strawson
1963/2003, 76-79). As Hieronymi puts it, the victim’s anger “affirms both
[the offense’s] wrongfulness and the moral significance of both herself and
the offender” (2001, 530). It is only because we recognize an expression
of ill will as coming from a fellow moral agent that we protest it. I would
not be angry at a tree for falling on my car during a storm, but I would be
angry at my neighbor for cutting her tree down so that it falls on my car.
The reason we protest such treatment is because we see ourselves as exist
ing in a relationship of mutual expectation and obligation. As a fellow moral
agent, I see myself as deserving a basic form of regard from my fellows and
as owing them the same basic regard.'^ When another shows me disregard.
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I protest this treatment and feelings of anger are partially constitute that
protest.
Given this sort of definition, advocates of the constitutive view will argue
that there is nothing irrational about anger. It is not irrational because protest
ing the display of ill will from another moral agent is not irrational. Since we
see ourselves and others as standing in relations of mutual regard, when that
mutual regard is violated, we will resist it. Anger is not, contra Pettigrove and
Tanaka, about our thwarted desires. It is not merely the case that I desire to be
treated as a moral agent, but rather that I expect to be and that the offender is
obligated to treat me as such. Contra Nussbaum, anger is also not about sta
tus. Anger at the offender is not about righting an imbalance or even bringing
her low. It is a protest against her ill will or disrespect.
Skeptics of the constitutive view can at this point dispute at least two of the
above claims. The first is the claim that we must be liable to anger in order
to see ourselves and others as moral agents, and they will point to moral
exemplars to make this case. Since I argued against moral exemplars earlier,
I will move on to the second claim. Skeptics might instead argue that there is
a better, more enlightened way of responding to wrongdoing than with anger.
In other words, even if anger is not confused or irrational, we would still be
better off if we were to train ourselves out of it. Those of who defend the con
stitutive view can admit that anger is sometimes damaging and hurtful. An
angry person is usually not a good friend, coworker, or spouse. Angry people
can be overly judgmental and unfairly expect more of others than they expect
of themselves. As Nussbaum puts it, “The world has been propelled to a large
extent by rage and retribution, but let us create something better, in ourselves
and in political culture” (2016, 247). Nussbaum makes two points here: (a)
anger’s downsides give us sufficient reason to want it out of our lives and (b)
that we would be better off or more virtuous if we decided to see ourselves,
others, and the world in such a way that would make anger less central.
Are anger’s downsides enough to outweigh its value? We must be careful
here that we are not motivated to reject anger on the wrong kinds of reasons.
Often injunctions against anger originate from its deleterious effects to the
person who becomes consumed by it. Of course, we can be rightly wary of
being consumed by an emotion without being wary of the emotion itself.
Think, for example, of the warning “Love is blind.” No one treats this cau
tion against love’s tendency to make us overlook the flaws of our beloved as
a reason to get over love altogether. The trouble, according to the skeptics,
is that even run-of-the-mill anger can have negative effects. As Pettigrove
and Tanaka argue, empirical psychology studies appear to provide evidence
for “spillover anger.” When we are angry, we tend to be more judgmental
and more assured of our own righteousness (2014, 279-280). At the same
time, as Cherry argues, the mistakes that people attribute to anger can also be
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attributed to our anger evaluations (2018, 57-58). That is, we tend to judge
people who express anger harsher than we should, we tend to be unsympa
thetic toward them, and we often do not take the time to try to understand why
they are angry (2018, 52-56). It may be the case, then, that the assumptions
we make about anger’s downsides are not as clear-eyed as we imagine.
Even if it is true that normal amounts of anger can have downsides, we
must ask whether they amount to sufficient reason for getting over anger.
There is a tendency to treat anger (and negative emotions in general) as a
psychological problem. Anger “eats away at my peace of mind—I lose sleep,
snap at my friends, become less effective at my work, and so on” (Murphy
1988, 23). That is, we ought to get over anger as a matter of good mental
health, achieving better productivity, having a more positive outlook, or just
being overall happier. Perhaps it is true that the person who never feels anger
is generally a healthier and more positive person, but on the constitutive view,
she would not thereby be morally better than the rest of us. Suppose that
she gotten over her anger because, by reading many articles about analytic
metaphysics, she has become convinced that all people, including herself, are
simply collections of atoms. She no longer sees herself as an agent and she
no longer sees others as agents. This view provides her with deep feelings of
serenity and happiness because she no longer feels the weight of responsibil
ity. Her new outlook leads her to be patient and compassionate with all of
her fellow creatures. Constitutivists will object that no matter how happy or
compassionate this person is, this would not count as moral improvement.
Once she has given up Strawson’s participant stance and no longer sees any
one as an agent, she had abdicated a foundational moral commitment. Even
if one is not a constitutivist, one must ask whether the change she makes is
a morally better one. Should we morally prefer an outlook that gives up on
the concept of agency provided it leads to peace of mind and compassion
with our fellow creatures? On what grounds do we assign so high a value to
positive attitudes?
My suspicion is that most skeptics do not seek to reconfigure our moral
commitments so radically. They simply think that anger is not necessary and,
since it is also undesirable, we should train ourselves out of it. This innocu
ous-sounding view, I suggest, is closer to its radical counterpart than it seems.
If the constitutivist can show that anger is neither irrational nor inherently
dangerous, the anger skeptic may still claim that it is better or more virtuous
to respond to wrongdoing with patience or compassion. The reasons to which
they will appeal to support this claim, however, often require the person feel
ing anger to downplay either her own agency or the wrongdoer’s agency.
Suppose I am deeply betrayed by a loved one. She had no excuse, no
sympathetic reasons, and did not act out of ignorance. Those who argue for
the desirability claim might see my anger as warranted, but will nevertheless
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say that it would be better for me not to be angry. What reasons will support
this claim? Skeptics might implore me to have compassion for the wrong
doer because she is merely human and humans make mistakes. This reason
presents the wrongdoing as a kind of error and suggests that human foibles
are inevitable or simply to be expected. To characterize wrongs as stemming
from human error is an attempt to defang the seriousness of the wrong—to
make it seem more innocent than it is. This sort of reason invites me to see
the wrongdoer as acting less intentionally, which is to treat her betrayal as
not really expressive of her agency. Likewise, appeals to my loved one’s dif
ficult circumstances (supposing she had them) aim to convince me that her
had behavior is the result not of her own doing, but rather the product of her
conditions. Suppose instead someone reminds me that I too might be capable
of such a betrayal: “There but for the grace of God go I.” These kinds of
appeals aim to undermine my own reasons to be hurt by or to object to the
betrayal. I ought to go easy on my betrayer because it is merely a matter of
luck that I am not in her shoes. Again, this encourages me to see both her
actions and my actions as the result of luck and not of agency. Reasons like
“You should be the bigger person” ask me to see compassion and patience as
an expression of maturity or higher virtue. Here they assume without justifi
cation that compassion is more mature than anger. They also paint a picture
of the offender as immature or childlike. “Be the bigger person” invites me to
see myself as superior to rather than equal to my betrayer. Also, these appeals
do not address the reason I am angry in the first place." The fact that patience
would make me the bigger person does not give me a reason not to be hurt by
my love one’s betrayal; it only gives me reason to be (allegedly) more mature.
Once we rule out the idea that anger is inherently vicious, irrational, or
damaging, we need some further reason to prefer positive attitudes to it,
especially if we grant that anger can be fair and justified. The reasons that
advocates of the desirability claim usually give in support of compassion
and patience rely on a more moderate version of the radical revisionist moral
outlook than it first appears. The reasons given in favor of positive responses
to wrongdoing usually require me to orient myself away from the participant
stance or deemphasize its importance. Those who argue in favor of compas
sion and against anger may not argue that we should give up on the concept
of agency altogether, but the reasons they give for responding to wrongdo
ing with positive attitudes often attempt to minimize the role of agency in
wrongdoing.
Still, one might think there is no denying that patience and compassion
are good and anger is bad. Compassion causes us to alleviate suffering, to
help us be realistic about our own flaws, and to be forgiving. Anger causes
us to want to hurt others, wrecks relationships, and makes us feel as though
we are righteous and justified in punishing. Skeptics about anger mistakenly
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believe that its presence is incompatible with the presence of patience and
compassion. As Hieronymi points it, not only do we get angry at those we
love, we love them while we are angry with them (2001, 539). Parents know
all too well how anger and patience can exist together, especially when they
are punishing their children for bad behavior. The constitutivist will go fur
ther: it is not merely that anger is compatible with compassion, but that we
cannot separate our positive and negative emotions so neatly. Philosophers
have often argued that anger is an expression of valuing or caring about
something. As Callard puts it, “Anger, fear, sadness, disappointment, jeal
ousy—these are signs of caring” (2018, 127). It is because I care about my
relationship with my loved one that I am angry at her betrayal. Feelings of
compassion and feelings of anger can both be expressions of valuing one
and the same person. Imagine a father who feels both compassion and anger
at his teenage son who makes stupid choices because he seeks acceptance
and belonging. The father sympathizes with his son’s needs and yet is angry
because he wants his son to realize that acceptance doesn’t have to come at
the cost of prudence. These kinds of complex emotional states are not mys
terious, and they show that anger and positive attitudes are not necessarily
in competition with each other. In fact, sometimes they arise from the same
source. The constitutive view can agree that compassion and patience are
good attitudes to have. Yet it will deny that these attitudes are always better
than anger.
We are liable to feelings of anger because we occupy the participant stance
with our fellow moral agents. When others show us disregard, ill-treatment,
and disrespect, we get angry because we value ourselves and our moral rela
tions. Getting over anger would require us to give up the participant stance or
to no longer see ourselves and others as responsible moral agents in relations
of mutual regard. Skeptics of the constitutive view believe that we can get
rid of anger and leave the rest of our moral psychology untouched or perhaps
even better off. I have argued here that getting over anger would require a
more radical transformation than the skeptics are willing to accept.

NOTES
1. The term “constitutive” comes from Watson (1993,120). Versions of this view
can be found in Strawson (1963/2003), Rawls (1971/2003), Murphy and Hampton
(1988), Murphy (2003), Gibbard (1990), Wallace (1994), Roberts (2003), Hieronymi
(2004), Smith (2005), Darwall (2006), Bell (2013), and Thomason (2018).
2. In keeping with Strawson (1963/2003), philosophers who defend this view often
use the term “resentment” rather than “anger.” I think there is no difference between
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the two, so I will use them interchangeably. As I will make clear, I define anger is a
way that is consistent with the definitions of resentment that one finds in the literature.
3. Solomon (1988) has a thorough discussion of objections like this.
4. My version of the constitutive view draws most directly on Strawson
(1963/2003), Rawls (1971/2003), Murphy and Hampton (1988), Murphy (2003), and
Solomon (1988).
5. The term comes from Rawls (1971/2003, 428).
6. Some might object here that we do get angry at inanimate objects. For exam
ple, I might yell obscenities and bang on my steering wheel when my car won’t start.
Philosophers who advocate for the view I defend here usually distinguish anger and
frustration (Wallace 1994, 21; Solomon 2007, 18). I am frustrated when my car won’t
start, when it rains on my picnic, or when the bus is late, but I am angry at people.
It is of course possible that we could be angry in cases where we anthropomorphize
objects or events, or when we focus on the intentions of the people who might have
made the objects or cause the events (“What kind of idiot wrote these directions?” I
might think as I struggle to assemble the bookcase).
7. Hieronymi characterizes resentment in this way (2001, 546-549).
8. Strawson (1963/2003), Murphy and Hampton (1988), Murphy (2003),
Solomon (1988, 2007), Wallace (1994), and Hieronymi (2001).
9. This is what Hieronymi calls “mutual regard” (2004, 124).
10. Murphy (1988, 22-23) and Hieronymi (2001, 530-531) discuss this point
regarding reasons to forgive.
11. Callard makes this point (2018, 128).
12. Solomon (2007), Bommartio (2017), and Callard (2018).
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